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Abstract
Multibiometrics aims at improving biometric security in
presence of spoofing attempts, but exposes a larger avail-
ability of points of attack. Standard fusion rules have been
shown to be highly sensitive to spoofing attempts – even in
case of a single fake instance only. This paper presents a
novel spoofing-resistant fusion scheme proposing the detec-
tion and elimination of anomalous fusion input in an ensem-
ble of evidence with liveness information. This approach
aims at making multibiometric systems more resistant to
presentation attacks by modeling the typical behaviour of
human surveillance operators detecting anomalies as em-
ployed in many decision support systems. It is shown to
improve security, while retaining the high accuracy level of
standard fusion approaches on the latest Fingerprint Live-
ness Detection Competition (LivDet) 2013 dataset.
1. Introduction
Multibiometrics involves the use of biometric fusion
techniques to combine evidence from multiple sources [16],
including sensors, modes, algorithms or instances, aiming
to (1) reduce biometric false acceptance and false rejection
error rates, (2) minimize failure-to-acquire/capture/enrol
rates (3) increase throughput (e.g., using fast indexing meth-
ods), and (4) counter spoofing attempts for single biometric
characteristics. However, depending on the type of fusion
applied, multibiometrics may cause increased exposure to
attacks involving single specific characteristics. A spoof at-
tack is an attempt to circumvent the system with the pre-
senter of the biometric simulating the trait of a different
claimed identity, e.g. by using an artificial gelatin finger
made from latent fingerprints. Even a single spoofed in-
stance may lead to a false accept in multimodal (combin-
ing modalities, like face and fingerprint) and more generic
multibiometric systems [15, 14, 3, 1]. Despite spoofing sen-
sitivity, it is reasonable to assume that it is typically more
difficult for an attacker to obtain multiple biometric samples
of a target identity to be claimed. It is therefore important
to improve the trade-off between cost and security to limit
drawbacks [10, 9, 13]. This is the aim of this paper.
In order to address the spoofing issue, liveness detection
methods [4, 5] have been proposed using additional data to
assess if the biometric is authentic. In multibiometric con-
figuration, obtained liveness measures may be considered
separately for each biometric evidence (modality, sensor or
unit) or jointly in the fusion scheme. In the first case, spoof-
detected evidence is typically excluded from fusion [10]. If
liveness detection is unavailable, the relative robustness of
several score-level fusion rules can be used to choose the
most robust fusion rule [1], but in either case information
may not be exploited in the most efficient manner. This
paper focuses on the second type of targeting spoofing at-
tempts in the fusion scheme under the assumption that a
subset of combined biometric evidence is spoofed. Pre-
sented methods aim at detecting such anomalies at score-
level taking optionally additional liveness of individual evi-
dence into account (see Fig. 1).
The contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) a
thorough evaluation of spoofing impact on fingerprint fu-
sion, (2) the investigation of lightweight parameterless (no
training) 1-median fusion using score-values only for in-
creased robustness versus spoofing attacks, (3) the proposal
and evaluation of a novel fusion scheme based on 1-median
filtering combining scores with liveness metadata for high
robustness versus non-zero-effort (i.e. with access to fake
biometric samples, in contrast to zero-effort without spoof-
ing) impostor attacks, using the latest Fingerprint Liveness
Detection Competition (LivDet) 2013 dataset.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
related work on spoofing impact on multibiometric system
security. Section 3 describes the proposed fusion scheme
presenting both, a score-only fusion method and a fusion
method taking additional meta-information into account.
The system under test, the adopted dataset, experimental
configuration and obtained results showing the effective-
ness of the proposed technique are highlighted in Section
4. Section 5 forms the conclusion.
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Figure 1. Proposed fusion architecture combining comparison scores si and liveness values li from observations oi and gallery samples gi.
2. Related Work
The task of combining scores from presentation attacks
and scores from biometric modalities or multiple instances
is still not standardized, and an active research topic [6, 9].
Several previous research projects have indicated the
vulnerability of multimodal biometric systems against sin-
gle or multiple biometric spoofing attacks [15, 14, 3, 1].
Akhtar et al. [2] conducted the first study to examine
the vulnerability of both parallel and serial fusion in bi-
modal (face and fingerprint) configuration against spoofing
attacks. Their results indicated that score-level fusion meth-
ods from the literature are not robust to spoofing attacks,
because both fusion modes can be fooled by a single bio-
metric. However, serial fusion gave better results, attaining
a better trade-off between performance, verification time,
user acceptability and robustness.
To enhance the security of a biometric fusion system,
several fusion schemes have recently been proposed. Ro-
drigues et al. [15] first addressed the security issue of spoof-
ing attacks against a multimodal biometric system. They
introduced two fusion schemes, by adding security param-
eters of each unimodal biometric system with match scores
and quality scores. The two schemes were based on ex-
tended likelihood ratio (LLR) and fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic
gave better overall performance in their experiment. An in-
creased robustness against spoofing attacks, compared with
traditional fusion rules, was indicated in their experiment
results.
More recently, Rattani et al. [13] claimed that image
quality, liveness measurement and match scores are nor-
mally influenced by the sensor. The authors developed a
learning-based fusion framework using a graphical model
by adding impact parameters for the sensor. Marasco et
al. [10] directly incorporated liveness detection with match
scores in their fusion scheme. The liveness detection is im-
plemented separately for each modality before fusion. If a
spoofing attempt is indicated, the current modality match-
ing score will be ignored in the fusion. In another work,
Marasco et al. [9] analysed three different types of fusion
schemes (sequential, classifier and Bayesian Belief Net-
work (BBN) ) combining match scores and liveness mea-
sures (degree of liveness). In testing on the LivDet2009
dataset, the BBN fusion scheme gave the best accuracy.
However, the results also indicated that the accuracy is af-
fected by the liveness detection performance.
Research on fusion between match scores and liveness
factors has only recently started. To our knowledge, the
evaluation has only been done with a single spoofing sam-
ple. In the proposed scheme, the evaluation is undertaken
with sets of spoofing samples of various sizes, taken from a
standard dataset.
3. Proposed Fusion Scheme
The idea of the proposed fusion scheme at score-level
[16] is to consider spoofing attempts in the fusion mod-
ule. Therefore, this work extends the framework of Ro-
drigues et al. [15] to liveness metadata (see Fig. 1). The
biometric system’s task is to decide, whether given a vec-
tor of biometric observation samples ~o = (o1, . . . on) an
identity claim referring to enrolled gallery samples ~g =
(g1, . . . , gn) for this individual (e.g. fingers, eyes, etc.)
is true (belonging to the class genuine) or false (belong-
ing to the class impostor ). Let i be the current index and
E(oi), E(gi) refer to extracted features of samples. Further,
si = C(E(oi), E(gi)) ∈ [0, 1] denote comparison scores
indicating the degree how much oi, gi resemble (assuming
lower values represent more likeliness) and li = L(oi) ∈
[0, 1] denote liveness scores (assuming higher values repre-
sent spoofs). The task of the fusion module F is to produce
a decision score based on the vectors of comparison scores
~s = (s1, . . . , sn) and liveness values ~l = (l1, . . . , ln) used
for verification V based on a threshold η:
V (~o,~g) :=
{
genuine, if F (~s,~l) ≥ η;
impostor , else.
(1)
The aim is to find a method F which is not affected in
performance if m out of the n instances of ~o are spoofed.
3.1. Median Filtering in Score Fusion
For an integration of counter-spoofing techniques into
biometric fusion, this work investigates fixed score rules
following Kittler et al.’s classical framework [7], where live-
ness ~l is not considered, see sum and median rules:
Fsum(~s) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
si; Fmedian(~s) :=
n
med
i=1
si. (2)
Being claimed to be outperformed by more effective sum
and product rules, the median rule has widely been ne-
glected in score-level fusion in general [16] and so far not
been investigated for counter-spoofing [1, 14]. This paper
introduces a variation of the median rule, called median-
filter for higher spoofing-resistance:
Fmf (~s) :=
1∑n
i=1M(~s, si)
n∑
i=1
M(~s, si)si. (3)
M(~s, si) :=
 1, if
∣∣∣∣si − nmedj=1 sj
∣∣∣∣ < φ;
0, else.
(4)
Parameter φ is either a fixed (trained) or score-dependent
threshold (our experiments employ the standard deviation
of scores: φ = 2σ, 3σ). The median filter uses the median
of the score-set to remove outliers and local average to find a
better representative. This fusion rule aims at: (1) higher re-
sistance to outliers, as generally single spoofed scores rep-
resent scores following a different (more genuine-like) dis-
tribution, (2) better representation of non-outliers using a
filter, (3) easy integration and (4) no need for training.
3.2. Median-filtered Score-and-Liveness Fusion
The addition of further metadata like liveness suggests
training to learn the impact of ancillary information. Fig. 2
Figure 2. Liveness and comparison scores with trained decision
boundary for genuine, impostor and 1-spoof pairs of one finger.
illustrates observed pairs of liveness and comparison scores
for sets of genuine, spoof and (zero-effort) impostor com-
parisons. Generic 2 class classifiers, as logistic regression
(LR) or support vector machines (SVM) can be employed
to find the hyperplane Ψ : ~w ·~x−~b = 0 optimally separating
these sets:
D = {(xi, yi)|xi ∈ Rd, yi ∈ {−1, 1}}, (5)
where d = 2 in the scheme combining scores and live-
ness, thus xi = (si, li) is the value-pair and {−1, 1} stand
for the sets genuine and joint impostor-spoof. In order to
combine multiple evidence in this scenario, again a median
filter is employed returning a fusion result in [0, 1]2:
F 2mf (~s,
~l) :=
1
n∑
i=1
M
([
~s
~l
]
,
[
si
li
]) n∑
i=1
M
([
~s
~l
]
,
[
si
li
]) [
si
li
]
. (6)
M
([
~s
~l
]
,
[
si
li
])
:=
 1, if
∥∥∥∥[sili]− nmedj=1 [sjlj]
∥∥∥∥ < φ;
0, else.
(7)
In this case, the 1-median (the geometric median) in Eu-
clidean space is employed, the point minimizing the sum of
distances to the sample points. The fusion result as a score-
liveness pair can be classified using LR or SVM returning
the (signed) distance to the dividing hyperplane as result:
Fmf (~s,~l) := dist(F
2
mf (~s,
~l),Ψ). (8)
This way, threshold variation is equal to moving the hy-
perplane separating the two (genuine and impostor) joint
score- and liveness-distributions. In experiments LR classi-
fication is used.
Table 1. EER/SEER (in %) and d-Prime results of four-finger fusion on LivDet2013 varying the number of spoofed fingers.
Method (S)EER d-Prime0-spoof 1-spoof 2-spoof 3-spoof 4-spoof 0-spoof 1-spoof 2-spoof 3-spoof 4-spoof
Sum rule 0.14 1.91 3.42 5.83 7.52 2.48 2.40 2.27 2.10 1.94
Median rule 1.56 1.23 2.75 5.05 7.5 2.43 2.41 2.27 2.07 1.87
Median filter 1.24 1.29 2.89 5.60 7.76 2.55 2.52 2.34 2.12 1.93
1-Median filter + LR 1.69 1.78 1.78 1.78 1.78 2.89 2.89 2.89 2.89 2.89
Figure 3. Genuine and impostor score distributions for multi-instance fingerprint fusion using the sum rule.
4. Experiments
In order to test the stability of proposed fusion methods
under spoofing attacks, a standard fingerprint recognition
system with a custom liveness detector is employed. The
tested system combines n = 4 multi-instance fingerprints,
simulating a simultaneous multi-finger acquisition device.
It is evaluated using spoof attack scenarios, where an im-
postor has access to m = 0, 1, . . . , n latent fingerprints of
different instances to create spoofed forgeries, while having
to present all n fingers for authentication (m-spoof attack).
4.1. Test Setup
The evaluation of the multibiometric system is carried
out using Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) by
varying system threshold η (see Eq. 1) showing the relation-
ship between Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR, the percent-
age of genuine users being accepted) and False Acceptance
Rate (FAR, percentage of impostors being accepted) for
m = 0, and Spoof False Acceptance Rate (SFAR, percent-
age of spoof-attempts being accepted) as introduced in [6]
for m > 0. In a similar manner (S)EER is referred to as the
(Spoof) Equal Error Rate where GAR=(S)FAR and decid-
ability index (d-Prime) as d′ = |µ1 − µ2| /
√
(σ21 + σ
2
2)/2
as measure how well distributions with mean µi and stan-
dard deviation σi are separated.
The CrossMatch sensor set of the LivDet2013 fingerprint
database is employed for evaluation, using left hand finger
images for training and right hand fingers for evaluation.
The test dataset containing 2500 live and 2000 spoof im-
ages using BodyDouble, Latex, Playdoh and WoodGlue as
spoofing materials is grouped into 186 classes providing 4
fingers each originating from the same person. Spoofing
attempts are simulated by randomly replacing m out of n
fingers with corresponding spoofs.
4.2. Test System
The Matlab-based system1 employs NIST’s open source
Biometric Image Software [12] for fingerprint recognition
and as spoofing detector a method following [11].
Feature extractor mindtct automatically detects minutiae
(level-2) features in the epidermis of human skin, tracking
position and orientation of ridge bifurcation and termination
points extractible at 350 to 500 dots per inch. It employs fin-
gerprint enhancement, generation of local ridge orientation
and frequency maps, local minutiae detection identifying
pixel patterns, minutiae filtering and quality assessment.
Minutiae points are compared using the bozorth3 al-
gorithm in 1:1 comparison mode. This translation and
rotation-invariant method uses location and orientation to
1www.cvg.rdg.ac.uk
estimate a pairing of minutiae in compatibility tables, tra-
verses and links entries into clusters, and accumulates a
match score. The more linked entries that exist, the larger
is the returned match score. A more detailed description of
fingerprint processing can be obtained from [8].
Spoofing detection employs regularized LR for classifi-
cation. The method is trained using the distinct left-hand
subset and achieves an error rate of 27.65% misclassified
fingerprints (ferrlive) and 24.2% misclassified fake finger-
prints (ferrfake) on the test-set.
4.3. Results
Table 1 lists results for (1) the reference fusion rules sum
and - augmenting evaluations [6, 3, 1] - median rule, (2)
the proposed median filtering using scores only, and (3) 1-
median filtering of score and liveness values with logistic
regression classification. All methods refer to 4-finger fu-
sion on LivDet2013 varying the number of spoofed fingers.
4.3.1 Impact of Spoofing on Fingerprint Fusion
Focusing on the question “How does a spoofing of m out
of n fingers impact on fusion?” m-spoof score distribu-
tions are examined. Figure 3 illustrates, that even a single
spoofed finger severely shifts the impostor score distribu-
tion (now containing also the impact of deceiving spoof fin-
gers in the fusion result) towards the genuine scores. This
is most likely due to sum rule fusion taking every score into
account without any rejection of outliers. From Table 1 and
Fig. 4 illustrating the ROC of standard sum rule fusion it
can be seen, that every additional finger increases EER by
an absolute value of ≈1.8-2.4%. Confirming results in [3]
that even a spoofing of a single finger impacts on recog-
nition accuracy, it is observed that even 4-finger spoofing
does not necessarily imply success for imposter attempt -
the overall reported sum rule EER in this case is 7.52% (vs.
0.14% 0-spoof). Fig. 2 illustrates spoof scores following a
different distribution than genuine scores for a single finger.
4.3.2 Targeting Spoofing in the Fusion Module
For answering the question “How to avoid a negative im-
pact of scores originating from fake fingerprints on over-
all recognition accuracy?” this paper proposed methods to
suppress this information at fusion stage. Even though be-
ing ignored so far due to the reported superiority of the sum
rule for zero-effort impostors [7] the experimental results
indicate that the median rule is more robust in a spoofing
environment, yielding a better EER for 1-spoofs (1.23%)
than the sum-rule (1.91%). However, for the 0-spoof case,
median rule rejects useful information. This can be targeted
by median filtering in finding a better representative of non-
outliers. In this case also d-Prime measures are clearly su-
perior. ROCs illustrated in Fig. 5 for 0-spoof and 1-spoofs
in the range of interest are approximately colliding with
Figure 4. Fingerprint spoofing ROC using Sum rule fusion.
EERs of 1.24% (0-spoof) and 1.29% (1-spoof). If 1 or 2
out of 4 fingers are spoofed, median filtering clearly outper-
forms the sum rule, while not using any ancillary informa-
tion. This is, because the median has a breakdown point of
0.5 and is able to suppress a number of outliers (scores from
spoofed fingers) up to half of samples. However, for zero-
effort impostors, the sum rule is still optimal, at least for
non-optimized φ. Experiments show, that 1-spoofing can
successfully be targeted by employing suitable fusion.
4.3.3 Integrating Scores and Liveness-values
While median-filtering delivers better results than the sum
rule for m-spoofing attempts with m > 0, as soon as the
number of spoofing attempts becomes larger than half of the
n instances, the performance degrades drastically. There-
fore, the question “How to integrate spoofing countermea-
Figure 5. Fingerprint spoofing ROC using Median filtering.
Figure 6. Fingerprint spoofing ROC using 1-Median filtering + LR.
sures in fusion rules?” is discussed in this section assessing
the proposed 1-median filtering of liveness-score pairs us-
ing the trained logistic regression model. From the ROC
curves for this fusion method in Fig. 6, it can be seen that
this method is much more robust versus 3-spoof and 4-spoof
attacks than sum or even median rule investigated before.
For (S)FARs greater than 10−3 corresponding GARs differ
minimally, with stable EERs in 1.69-1.78% (d-Prime 2.89)
over all spoofing attempts. This is remarkable, given the
low spoofing detection rate and illustrates the superior se-
curity performance of the proposed method compared to the
other presented techniques. As the number of combined in-
stances is low, median filtering comes at little computing
overhead.
5. Conclusion
Recent studies indicated a high impact of spoofing on
fusion recognition accuracy. In this paper we contributed
a fusion scheme using outlier detection employing the 1-
median with two implemented methods as a means to de-
tect score anomalies for increased security in multibiomet-
ric systems. Results illustrated how scores in a multi-finger
spoofing scenario degrade, ifm out of n fingers are spoofed.
While median filtering comes at the cost of slightly reduced
0-spoof performance, it is much more robust than sum rule
fusion if a minority of features is spoofed. Experiments on
LivDet2013 data showed that the proposed integrated scores
and spoofing-countermeasures fusion using trained LR clas-
sification with median filtering is able to almost eliminate
the impact of spoofing, retaining stable 1.69-1.78% EER
over all m-spoof tests. As future research we envision the
incorporation of quality into the scheme, optimized selec-
tion of the median filter parameter φ, and an evaluation on
other multimodal databases.
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